We approach security from the point of view of the DHT's Keyspace Density.
The following plots examine the peer distribution within the keyspace, aiding in the identification of potential Sybil and eclipse attacks.
Every object indexed by discv5 requires a binary identifier. In the discv5 implementation, peers are identified by their NodeID (extracted from their ENR) which is the `keccak256` hash of its uncompressed `secp256k1` public key. This identifier determines the location of an object within the XOR keyspace.
The plot shows how many peers are included in a particular region of the keyspace. Too many peers within one region indicate a potential issue.
The plot shows the distribution of the PeerIDs across the Poisson curve. Too many PeerIDs outside the curve indicate a potential issue.
These plots depict the count of node records stored within each node’s routing table and made accessible through the discv5 DHT. These node records serve as a mechanism through which nodes discover new remote nodes in the network.
Reachable vs Unreachable DHT Records Over Time
Reachable vs Unreachable DHT Records Over Time
Our network monitoring employs advanced crawling and probing tools and techniques to gather comprehensive data about network health, topology, and performance
A Data Availability Sampling tool to asses Ethereum Node's real custody
A CID sniffer for content in IPFS over Bitswap and DHT requests
A performance measurement tool for Kubo and IPFS-hosted websites.
A DHT and IPNI lookup performance measurement tool.
A DHT monitoring tool for NAT'd peers.
A lightweight GossipSub tracer.
A network agnostic DHT crawler and monitoring tool