Research | ProbeLab Analytics

BCCA '23 Conference Paper · Oct 2023

Unveiling Ethereum's Hidden Centralization Incentives: Does Connectivity Impact Performance?

Mikel Cortes-Goicoechea · Tarun Mohandas-Daryanani · Jose Luis Munoz-Tapia · Leonardo Bautista-Gomez

Modern public blockchains like Ethereum rely on p2p networks to run distributed and censorship-resistant applications. With its wide adoption, it operates as a highly critical public ledger. On its transition to become more scalable and sustainable, shifting to PoS without sacrificing the security and resilience of PoW,Ethereum offers a range of consensus clients to participate in the network. In this paper, we present a methodology to measure the performance of the consensus clients based on the latency to receive messages from the p2p network. The paper includes a study that identifies the incentives and limitations that the network experiences, presenting insights about the latency impact derived from running the software in different locations.

CSUR '23 Journal Article · Jul 2023

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks – A Systematic Literature Review

Cornelius Ihle · Dennis Trautwein · Moritz Schubotz · Norman Meuschke · Bela Gipp

Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze 11 literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources.

arxiv Preprint · Jun 2023

Data Availability Sampling in Ethereum: Analysis of P2P Networking Requirements

Michał Król · Onur Ascigil · Sergi Rene · Etienne Rivière · Matthieu Pigaglio · Kaleem Peeroo · Vladimir Stankovic · Ramin Sadre · Felix Lange

Despite their increasing popularity, blockchains still suffer from severe scalability limitations. Recently, Ethereum proposed a novel approach to block validation based on Data Availability Sampling (DAS), that has the potential to improve its transaction per second rate by more than two orders of magnitude. DAS should also significantly reduce per-transaction validation costs. At the same time, DAS introduces new communication patterns in the Ethereum Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. These drastically increase the amount of exchanged data and impose stringent latency objectives. In this paper, we review the new requirements for P2P networking associated with DAS, discuss open challenges, and identify new research directions.

ICBC '23 Conference Paper · May 2023

Autopsy of Ethereum's Post-Merge Reward System

Mikel Cortes-Goicoechea · Tarun Mohandas-Daryanani · Jose Luis Muñoz-Tapia · Leonardo Bautista-Gomez

Like most modern blockchain networks, Ethereum has relied on economic incentives to promote honest participation in the chain's consensus. The distributed character of the platform, together with the “randomness” or “luck” factor that both proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS) provide when electing the next block proposer, pushed the industry to model and improve the reward system of the system. With several improvements to predict PoW block proposal rewards and to maximize the extractable rewards of the same ones, the ultimate Ethereum's transition to PoS applied in the Paris Hard-Fork, more generally known as “The Merge”, has meant a significant modification on the reward system in the platform. In this paper, we aim to break down both theoretically and empirically the new reward system in this post-merge era. We present a highly detailed description of the different rewards and their share among validators' rewards. Ultimately, we offer a study that uses the presented reward model to analyze the performance of the network during this transition.